Although Sierra Leone's diamonds made headlines only recently when the United Nations Security Council placed an embargo on exports of the gems, the country has had a long and troubled history with its diamond mines. Sierra Leone has been a major diamond producer for 70 years, but it has one of the lowest Gross National Products in the world and is last on the United Nations' Human Development Index, which rates the level of human development in 174 countries. Unlike other African countries, such as Botswana where the diamond industry has had a positive effect, diamonds and the corrupt politics they fostered have torn Sierra Leone apart.

In the Beginning

At first, the mining of Sierra Leone's diamond resources was a legal, economic endeavor. In 1935, De Beers' Sierra Leone Selection Trust gained complete prospecting and mining rights for 99 years. However, Lebanese traders within Sierra Leone quickly discovered smuggling diamonds brought easy profits, and illicit mining and trading grew throughout the country.

By the time a diamond rush began in the 1950s, the government gave up policing the diamond districts. Foreign investors provided their own security. To crack down on the growing illicit diamond trade, however, the government tightened security between Kono, a large diamond district, and Freetown, the country's major exporting site. This increase in security caused smugglers to move illicit goods through Liberia, creating the illegal diamond pipeline between Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In 1956, the government introduced the Alluvial Mining Scheme, which allowed many indigenous miners to receive mining and trading licenses. The scheme also resulted in increased illegal mining, as 75,000 illicit miners populated the Kono district.

After Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain in 1961, diamond smuggling became a political problem, as well as an economic problem. Sierra Leone has not had a stable government since independence; it fluctuates between multi-party democracy and one-party rule. In 1968, populist Siaka Stevens became prime minister, bringing the country to one-party rule. Stevens was the first to officially connect the diamond mines to political power and profit, and he encouraged illicit mining to gain political power. He nationalized the diamond mines and De Beers' SLST by creating the National Diamond Mining Co. Through NDMC, Stevens gave himself and his key advisor, Lebanese businessman Jamil Mohammed, control of the diamond mines. Under Stevens' authority, legitimate diamond trading dropped from more than two million carats in 1970 to 595,000 carats in 1980 and 48,000 carats in 1988.

Civil War Begins

At the end of Stevens' 17-year rule, De Beers removed itself from deeply corrupt Sierra Leone. In 1984, De Beers' SLST sold its remaining shares to the Precious Metals Mining Co., controlled by Mohammed. A year later, Stevens retired and his successor, Joseph Momoh, having little political or leadership skills, placed even more responsibility in Mohammed's hands, and illicit diamond mining within Sierra Leone flourished. In 1991, with a weak leader, a corrupt government and openly illicit diamond trading, Sierra Leone was a vulnerable and attractive site for armed rebellion. On March 23, a civil war began when the Revolutionary United Front, a group of 100 fighters from Sierra Leone and Liberia, invaded east Sierra Leone.

Foday Sankoh, an ex-army sergeant and professional photographer in his 50s, led the RUF. Sankoh said he represented the urban dispossessed and promised impoverished peasants a greater share in the mineral wealth misused by the corrupt government. However, Sankoh used brutal tactics, such as mutilation and amputation, against these same peasants to allegedly expose the government's inability to protect its citizens.

Throughout the nine-year civil war, fighting concentrated in and around the diamond districts. RUF leaders were keenly aware that whoever controls the diamond mines controls Sierra Leone, and profits from smuggled diamonds funded its attack. Since the civil war began, Sierra Leone has suffered complete desolation. It is wholly dependent on outside support from Great Britain, Nigeria and South Africa's security forces. Sierra Leone's own army is corrupt; its soldiers are nicknamed "Sobels," rebels by day, soldiers by night.

Finally, in July 1999, Sankoh and Sierra Leone's president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, signed the Lome Peace Accord under pressure from the U.N. and the U.S. government. RUF agreed to surrender its forces for a share in Sierra Leone's government. As a concession to RUF, Sankoh was released from the death sentence he earned for his war crimes and made chairman of the Strategic Mineral Resources Commission, a position that controlled most of Sierra Leone's diamond exports.

Although the accord was long in coming, it brought a short peace. On Jan. 6, 2000, just seven months after it was signed, RUF revived its attacks on Freetown and Sierra Leone's government. Despite its promises to surrender its forces, RUF never did. Now Sierra Leone is once again battling RUF, and control over the diamond mines is still at the center of the conflict. However, with the U.N. ban on Sierra Leone's diamond exports and De Beers' promise to help the country learn to peacefully profit from its resources, the government has a chance to regain power over legitimate mining and the country.

- by Lauren Thompson

Lauren Thompson is an English major at Mount Holyoke College and has studied African history. She will spend her junior year at the University of Sussex in England.

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